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Abstract
This essay is an analysis of American and Russian oratory within the context of the conflict in 
Syria. The purpose of the analysis is to delineate Russian and American understandings of an 
eventual military intervention in Syria, as well as depicting which images of the self and the enemy 
that are mediated through both countries' rhetoric. This search for images is based on the idea that 
powerful countries deliberately or subconsciously mediate certain pictures of themselves and their 
adversaries using certain terms and phrases. Further theoretical foundations for this research will be 
ideas concerning the construction of enemy images, mirror images and binary oppositions. 
Following the analytical discussion in the essay, we can in the end see how Russian and 
American oratory contain traces of both enemy images and mirror images as well as binary 
oppositions. The pictures are in many ways similar to each other, even if they also differ from one 
another in significant ways. Some of their similarities, such as mirroring characteristics, will be 
briefly debated in the last section of this writing. 
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1. Introduction
This essay will be divided into three parts. This opening section shall be treating the theoretical 
foundations laid out for the purpose of this text, as well as it will be saying some words about the 
method used during the research. Possible limitations and demarcations of the material and analysis 
will also be discussed. Following this section comes the essay's analytical part, namely an analysis 
of the primary material utilized. The concluding chapter will contain a discussion including a 
reasoning of the relationship between the analytical result and this essay's theoretical basis, and will
be finished by a paragraph stating some completive thoughts about the results . 
1.1 The Aim and Purpose of this Essay
This composition is an analysis of the United States' and Russia's rhetoric within the context of the 
ongoing conflict in Syria. The aim of this analysis is to examine the oratory of these countries in 
order to depict three things. First of all, the purpose is to delineate any opinion each country may 
have of the eventuality of intervening with force in the situation in Syria. Both countries views of 
such an intervention are related to and of importance to the following two questions of this analysis 
and they are therefore investigated. Secondly, I wish to examine which understanding of itself either
country is subconciously or deliberately mediating through its rhetoric when making official 
statements or remarks about the Syrian conflict. Similarly, and finally, I am also going to review 
what perception each country is encouraging of its opponent in this issue. The first question is akin 
to the succeeding ones in the way that the image of the self and other are also connected to the 
understanding of an intervention. Since both countries have different opinions on the intervention-
issue, these opinions also reflect the images they want to present of each other, as we shall see. 
As we can see, all three points are related to each other and serves the higher purpose of 
investigating how images are created in the American and Russian oratory. Hence, to summarize, 
the specific purpose of this essay is to examine the American and Russian comprehension of an 
intervention, together with the highlighting of self- as well as enemy images emerging in 
superpower rhetoric within the frame of the ongoing conflict in Syria. 
1.2 Creating Enemy Images and Binary Oppositions
When analyzing American and Russian rhetoric within the frame of the Syrian conflict the aim is to 
be able to depict what kind of image both countries wish to mediate of themselves and their 
opponent. The analysis will be based on an idea of countries seeking to picture themselves and 
other agents in specific ways in order to achieve political goals in the international arena. By 
promoting a certain perception of their character and connecting themselves to powerful epithets, 
countries may create an opportunity of influencing other states' understandings of and attitudes 
towards them. Consequently, this kind of image-building may in the long run have an impact on 
countries' roles and on what kind of influence they have in the international community. It can 
create opportunities for promoting all of the good qualities connected to the self, or for smearing 
your opponent in a delicate way. The idea is that all states in some way or another create such 
images, deliberately or subconciously, and that it is possible to find pieces or traces of these 
desireable pictures in for example rhetoric or actions. 
It is my firm belief that different created images of Russia and America will emerge when 
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examining the rhetoric of the superpowers closer. Hopefully it will be possible to discover in what 
way the countries are putting their images together and a clear comprehension of how they wish to 
depict themselves and each other will come into existence. 
My theory is connected to the ever so present idea of enemy images that appear in studies of
conflicts and conflict behavior.1 Enemy images represent in the case of conflict different beliefs and 
assumptions about (usually more or less hostile) individuals or groups.2 These profiles can be and 
are often grounded in misconceptions and distorted images about other personages and their 
intentions towards ourselves. There is usually no need for enemy images to be completely rational 
or even related to the objective truth. They are plainly imaginations of our enemies with the purpose
of distancing and disconnecting ourselves from the characteristics and conduct of our opponents. 
The images are a way for us to contrast ourselves with our adversaries in order to create feelings of 
a clash between an ingroup and an outgroup. Enemy images hence play an important role in the 
maintenance and reinforcement of hostile attitudes and violent behavior, in part since they are 
affecting the way we look upon our enemies behavior.3 A frequent effect of images of this kind is 
that enemy conduct is misinterpreted and connected to incorrect underlying causes. For example, 
amibiguous acts could be seen as threatening, while friendly acts are pictured as devious and 
manipulative.4 Often violent and hostile behavior from the opposing side becomes normalized, 
whilst peaceful acts aiming at reconciliation may be pictured as exceptions.5 It is also common to 
attribute one's own belligerent and hostile actions to external circumstances, while attributing the 
same kind of behavior from the opponent to internal characteristics.6 In short, enemy images are 
utilized by states partially to justify antagonistic actions and attitudes towards other actors. 
This essay will also rely on theories concerning the creation of binary oppositions and 
mirror images, connected to Philip Smith's thesis of cultural codewords.7 By using binary 
oppositions, countries are putting together images of the self as well as the adversary through the 
application of specific designations.8 Typically the terms connected to the self are positive in 
character, while the designations negative counterparts are attached to the opponent.9 One typical 
example would be states frequently depicting their own behavior as rational, while opposing 
countries consequently are described as irrational and illogical. Governments seek to picture 
themselves as the positive contrast of the ones they are fighting, as to separate themselves from the 
1 For a brief, yet thorough explanation of the relation between enemy images and the development of conflicts see for 
example Social Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate and Settlement by Dean G. Pruitt and Sung Hee Kim. The book 
provides an easily understood explication of how enemy images and other psychological processess may affect 
conflict escalation and settlement. 
2     Oppenheimer, Louis; The Development of  Enemy Images: A Theoretical Contribution; Peace and Conflict: 
Journal of Peace Psychology; Vol 12(3); Sep. 2006; pp 269-292; Publisher: Lawrence Erlbaum (Journal Article); 
Database: PsycARTICLES; p 271
3 Oppenheimer; 2006: 270
4 Oppenheimer; 2006: 272
5 Sande, Gerald N, Goethals, George R, Ferrari, Lisa and Worth, Leila T; Value-Guided Attributions: Maintaining the 
Moral Self-Image and the Diabolical Enemy-Image;  Journal of Social Issues; Summer 1989; Vol 42 Issue 2; pp 91-
118
6 Oppenheimer; 2006: 275
7 Smith, Philip; Why War? The Cultural Logic f Iraq, the Gulf War and Suez; Chicago; University of Chicago Press; 
2005
Smith, Philip; Codes and Conflict: Toward a Theory of War as Ritual;Theory and Society; Vol. 20 No. 1; Feb. 1991; 
pp 103-138; Published by Springer
8 See for example the underlying code of binary oppositions used by Smith when theorizing the cultural discourse 
present during the Falklands War (Smith; 1991: 117)
9 Smith; 1991: 115 
5
behavior of their opponents and create dichotomies of positive and negative oppositions. For 
example, legal and rational epithets are often linked to the own side to prove the legitimacy of the 
actions of the government.10 Following the idea of binary oppositions, contrasting behavior would 
be seen as illegal and irrational, thus challenging the legitimacy of the opposing government. The 
use of binary oppositions reflect in what way states want to contrast themselves from their enemies 
and the use of each such opposition serves a certain purpose. 
Smith furthers the theory of the use of binary oppositions, composing the oppositions into a 
code of words used by states during crises. This code of oppositions reflects what image the state 
whishes to mediate of itself as well as what picture it wants to promote of its enemy. Important 
though, is that these images have to be “couched in terms of the shared codes of civil society” in 
order to be effective.11 Hence the meaning and significance of the words or terms used has to be 
carefully measured since different definitions and ways of interpreting play great role in what effect 
these codes and images will have . Furthermore, dominant actors or people with control over means 
of communication may affect definitions and interpretations, something which has to be kept in 
mind.12 Indeed, Smith states that “actors are not able to perform any action they wish with the 
expectation that their rhetorics of legitimation will always be accepted or believed”.13 Other actors 
may well interpret the oratory in ways separate from what was meant by the sender. 
According to Smith's thinking, it is also important that the behavior of the state matches the 
codewords set up if it wishes to maintain this peculiar picture of the self.14 Conduct and actions seen
by onlookers as not matching the codewords will risk erupting this self-image and may be used as a 
base for questioning the authority and legitimacy of the state and its conduct. 
Persuant to Smith, the use of codes is precisely one of the ways in which “constituencies and
players make sense of wars and the situations that might lead up to them”.15 The author means that 
narratives and storytelling are some of the most effective ways of generating wide support and 
legitimating warlike actions (the kind of storytelling most efficacious in this case would be the one 
that Smith names “apocalyptic narrative”).16 Consequently, efforts to de-legitimate one's enemy's 
actions and justifications would involve attempts to erase the apocalyptic element of these 
narratives by for example rediscribing or redefining objects, actors or motivations.17 
The theories of how enemy images are created and binary oppositions composed will be 
kept in mind when examining the language of Russia and the US. I will be looking for traces of 
existing enemy images that these countries may have of each other. The rhetoric will be investigated
in order to find what terms and  words are used when both countries work on mediating hidden 
messages about themselves and the other. The idea is to highlight these concealed images and 
messages that lie beneath the oratory as to make clear what kind of image each country wishes to 
promote. Furthermore, the language will be analyzed while looking for any clear pattern of binary 
oppositions that may appear. Possibly, both sides will reveal completely contrary pairs of binary 
oppositions. 
10 Smith; 1991: 116
11 Smith; 2005: 12-13
12 Smith; 2005: 12
13 Smith; 2005: 47
14 Smith; 1991: 118-119
15 Smith; 2005: 7
16 Smith; 2005: 26-27
17 Smith; 2005: 27 
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1.3 Method
As already stated, this essay will be a rhetorical examination of certain statements from Russia and 
America. While analysing these remarks I will look through a filter made of the theories about 
enemy images and binary oppositions explained in the previous section. I will carefully examine the
documents chosen in order to detect all traces of images and such oppositions. 
The method used for this essay will be based on Philip Smiths analysis of how different 
countries justify their actions and standpoints during situations of war.18 Smith uses a method 
founded on inter alia investigations of narrative and different stories depicted mainly in the media. 
The writer then searches for evidence of culture and narrative as a “provider of motivations and 
classifications” and as a “resource that enables interests to be translated into actions”.19 In short, 
Smith uses the media and culture as a base for finding vindications and motivations for actions of 
war, and as a way of investigating how cultural mandates for war are composed.
My own analysis will be methodically analogous to Smith's, with some smaller 
justifications. For instance, the primary material utilized is significantly limited in scope compared 
to Smith's resources. While Smith is investigating the media at large, this essay is based on reviews 
of statements and remarks deriving from presidents and some other exalted politicians. This 
implicates that this analysis perhaps will be based on examinations of political narratives rather than
broader cultural ones. I have also limited the scope of the analysis compared to Smith in that it is 
accomplished within the context of the ongoing Syrian conflict, thereby at large forfeiting the 
comparative element Smith is using in his analysis, as his investigations are based on four different 
countries and three different conflicts.20 My comparative segment will only consist of the 
contrasting of Russian and American images. 
The main lesson from Smith that I will be carrying in mind during my work is his theories of
how cultural discourse can be systematized into mirror images and binary oppositions.21 It is mainly
this segment of his method that I will be using during my own examinations of rhetorics. Moreover,
this analysis will be mainly oriented towards the searching for self- and enemy images sooner than 
the discovery of cultural justifications for warlike actions. It is also therefore I will be helped by 
theories of enemy images during my research (in point of fact, Smith as well recognizes the 
importance of enemy images while justifying hostile actions, as he points out that “it is the image of
the enemy and the narrative inflation of the precipitating crisis that lead to war”).22
1.4 Demarcations and Limitations of the Material
This essay will, as said, be based on an analysis of the oratory of the United States and Russia 
within the body of the conflict in Syria. In order to make such an analysis manageable, I have made 
certain necessary delimitations of the primary material used. 
The analysis of the rhetoric has first of all been limited to the oratory of Russia and the US. I
have chosen to examine further these countries as they are both superpowers on the international 
arena, and thus likely have an image and important core interests that they are eager to protect. 
There is accordingly a strong probability that both superpowers have clear opinions of what kind of 
18 For a more thorough explanation of Smith's choice of method, see Smith; 2005: 35-56
19 Smith; 2005: 47
20 Smith; 2005
21 See for example Smith; 2005: 15-16. Here Smith systematizes three kinds of civil discourse into pairs of binary 
oppositions. 
22 Smith; 2005: 208
7
image they want to maintain of themselves in order to achieve their national political goals. 
Moreover, these countries' stories are clearly connected and they have a long history of cold 
and hot enmity. It is therefore not far-fetched to believe that they already would have created certain
images of each other as enemies. Since America and Russia also often are depicted as completely 
contrasting powers with reverse interests, there is a strong case that the pictures they want to emit of
each other and themselves would be fairly opposite. Hence tracing binary oppositions in the rhetoric
would not be an impossible mission. 
Additionally, both Russia and the United States are permanent members of the United 
Nations Security Council. This implies that they have a close to unique opportunity to express their 
opinions in the case and enforce their national claims, which opens up for the eventuality of finding 
such utterances clearly expressed in national statements. I have also chosen to investigate the 
oratory of solely these two members of the Council, this to limite the scope of the analysis as well 
as to increase the chance of finding two completely opposite images. 
Furthermore, the analysis has been limited in scope to statements concerning the current 
conflict in Syria. Syria has been chosen as a framework for this examination as to further highlight 
the disparate interests and views of Russia and the US. The powers have completely different 
opinions on what should be done to avoid further menaces in Syria, and if possible even more 
contrasting views on the possibility of intervening military in the conflict. I have also limited the 
extent of the essay in this way in order to make the volume and scope of the rhetoric analyzed more 
manageable. Simply looking at the oratory of the superpowers without any limitations like this 
would be a workload requiring more time and resources than available for this essay. 
Additional limitations to the time span of the material has been made. The time span has 
been limited to statements from the year of 2013. This is partly because of the reasons stated above, 
but also because of the fact that this is a currently ongoing conflict where conduct and viewpoints of
the countries involved may change rapidly. It is also a conflict that has escalated during the later 
half of the year of 2013, and where relations between the superpowers have tensed. Therefore the 
material in use has been limited in this way in order to get the clearest view of the present tensions 
between Russia and America in this issue.
The type of material further investigated are statements from the presidents of both 
countries, certain press briefings concerning the conflict in Syria, one article published by Russian 
President Putin in the New York Times and several questionings by journalists including the 
presidents. The material is limitated in first hand to statements and remarks by the presidents, as 
they are the  representatives of their countries and hence responsible for the image of the powers 
political attitudes and opinions (however, certain remarks and press briefings are made by other 
political agents). Remarks made at this political level certainly have to be carefully measured, 
thereby making any traces of images or codewords found less coincidental. The press briefings and 
questionings have been chosen as a contrast to these thought out statements. Here the politicians 
interviewed may not always be prepared on what questions are to be asked, providing an interesting
perception on how both countries subconsciously view themselves and each other. Deliberate 
pronouncings together with unprepared statements will hopefully compose a rather just portrait of  
both countries' views. 
During the research for material, several documents concerning the Syrian conflict from the 
perspectives of Russia and America have been reviewed.23 However, the documents mentioned 
23 Other documents reviewed has been for example some eight pronouncingcs related to the Syrian conflict released on
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above have been selected for further examination, as they provide clear evidence of Russia's and 
America's disparate views on an eventual intervention and on the different images they wish to 
mediate. It should be mentioned that remaining documents investigated do not describe an image 
contrary to the one depicted in the selected documents, but plainly are short of enough fruitful 
remarks for a more careful examination to take place. 
1.5 Analytical Limitations 
I am aware of the fact that the choice of material and method limitates this analysis in certain ways. 
One of the bigger disadvantages when chosing the conflict in Syria as the essay's framework is that 
a large amount of the discussions and negotiations concerning the clash take place behind closed 
doors and are not made official. Hence an analysis of this sort is limitated in scope to those 
documents each country has made public, which may conclude in a biased analysis which does not 
accurately reflect the truth. There may be underlying reasons why each country has made certain 
documents official, something that can affect the result of this analysis. Therefore this essay does 
not claim to provide a universal view of the connections between Russia and the US, it is simply an 
examination of the rhetoric of both countries found in certain selected documents. Different images 
of the self and the other and additional binary oppositions may have been found if the analysis had 
been based also on these informal papers. It is also important to clarify that this analysis only 
depicts these images within the context of the Syrian conflict. Russia and America may well have 
different understandings of each other within other contexts. I am also aware of the fact that these 
statements do not reflect the view of the common American or Russian civilan, but are measured 
political remarks with a certain goal. The Russian or American people presumably have different 
views of themselves and others than are discovered in the essay. 
There is also a risk of incorrect analysis when pondering the fact that the examination is 
based solely on English versions of each document. As I am not a native Russian speaker, there has 
been no opportunity to analyse documents in Russian. This is a drawback to the analysis as some of 
the hidden content and meaning of the rhetoric of the documents examined may have gone lost 
when they were translated into English. I have also missed out on the opportunity to examine 
documents published only in Russian, as for example speeches or statements directed to the Russian
people. This may result in an incomplete conslusion when investigating Russian standpoints, as I 
may have missed out on important material. 
Worth mentioning is also the fact that the analysis may be affected by my own prejudices 
and by possible preconceived understandings I have of both cuntries. These may have had an 
infuence on my interpretations of the material. As mentioned before, countries work hard on what 
picture they wish to bring about of themselves and others, and it is not impossible that these pictures
might already have affected me in some way. It is also possible that I may have over-interpreted 
certain pronouncements in the search of binary oppositions and enemy images.
the official website of the Russian government (http://government.ru/en/search/?phrase=syria&section=all), as well 
as all official statements released by the President of Russia on his website (http://eng.kremlin.ru/ ), related to the 
Syrian conflict and released during the year of 2013. Some pronouncings made by the Russian foreign ministry have
also been read. As for American remarks, they all derive from the official website of the Whitehouse. Here, almost 
all statements concerning the conflict in Syria from 2013 have been overlooked, using keywords suck as “syria”, 
“syria intervention” and “syria statement”, among others. 
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1.6 Further Remarks about the Material
I have during my research  found certain differences about both the material interpreted during this 
analysis and about the images found in each document. To start up, it has been easier to find 
statements, pronouncements and further remarks concerning the conflict in Syria coming from the 
American side than from the Russian part. Russia provides very few official documents on this 
subject, at least in English, while it is possible to find a large amount of pronouncements from the 
American President and American politicians. I do not know what the underlying causes of these 
differences are. Possible explanations, among others, may be that Russia has chosen to publish only 
a few remarks in English, or that America simply find it more important and rewarding to make 
public statements about these issues . Certain is that this has affected the analysis in that I have had 
the possibility to review and investigate a larger number of American documents than Russian ones.
This implicates that I have had an overall broader base for making assumptions about US 
standpoints and views compared to suppositions made about Russian images. Yet, it should be 
stated that for the purpose of this essay, I have further investigated an almost equal number of 
Russian and American statements. 
Furthermore, there has been a large difference in the amount of “evidence” of the different 
images of Russia and America that I have found in the documents examined more thoroughly. 
Generally speaking American documents have provided more traces of these pictures than have 
Russian ones. There is also a difference in how much effort and energy the countries have put into 
creating its own image versus a profile of the other. While America seems to have worked a lot on 
mediating a preferable picture of itself and only in part mentioned Russian characteristics, Russia 
appears to have put equal amounts of time into creating profiles of both sides, possibly a little more 
effort into the American image. To clearify, America seem to find it more important to mediate an 
image of itself than creating an enemy image, whilst Russia find both tasks equally important or 
inessential (though, this contradicts the belief that Philip Smith holds that “depictions of evil seem 
to have greater implications for war politics than images of our own “good” leaders”. According to 
this way of thinking, countries should likely be putting more effort into depicting their enemies as 
diabolic or evil and far less effort into promoting themselves as genuinely good, as this would be 
more rewarding).24 It also appears as if the US has a clear and solid understanding of what image it 
wants to present of itself, regardless of what context,  while the Russian self image is in part more 
linked to the context in Syria. Hence there is a difference in how these superpowers use enemy 
images and and the promotion of self-images in the Syrian conflict. Though, these differences may 
be explained by the fact that all documents examined in this essay are different in character, and 
thus serve different purposes. For example, the main goal during those questionings by journalists 
that have been analysed may not have been to mediate particular images of each country, something
which may in part explain these differences.
24 Smith; 2005: 21
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2. Analysis
2.1 The View on a Possible Intervention in Syria
Within the last two years, relations between Russia and the United States have been strained due to 
different opinions on how to handle the current situation in Syria. One of the bigger issues 
discussed is how the international community should respond to the chemical weapons attacks 
taking place in Damascus in late August this year. Since particulary the United States has a very 
resolute view on the use of weapons of this kind, these events have opened up for a discussion on 
the possibility of intervening in the Syrian conflict. American President Barack Obama has stated 
the attacks as ”an assault on human dignity” and describes inaction as risking to make ”a mockery 
of the global prohibition on the use of chemical weapons”.25 The American President has thus made 
a decision to involve in the conflict and take military action against Syria, a decision that did not 
recieve a warm welcoming on the other side of the Pacific Ocean. 
Russia and the US clearly has contrasting opinions on what should be done in the case of 
chemical weapons being used in Syria. When discussing the eventuality of taking action and 
stepping in in the violent and chaotic Syrian conflict , both superpowers try to picture the 
intervention and its outcomes in a certain way. I am here going to analyze the content of these 
differing pictures, as they are in part related to the way both countries are portraying themselves and
each other. Behind these perceptions of an intervention lie hidden messages of how Russia and the 
United States visualize their opponents, messages which I am going to expose. 
As already mentioned, the US sees the attacks in Damascus as an assault on human dignity. 
For the US, intervention in Syria is about defending the value of human dignity and sending a sharp
message to the ones responsible for carrying out the attacks.26 It is also about defending the 
international law and order, and to remove all doubt whether weapons of this type are to be allowed.
Inaction and passitivity are seen as dangerous and irresponsible, whilst a military strike is seen as 
holding a gruesome dictator and his regime liable for the crimes they have committed. When 
discussing the fact that a military intervention would in this case be performed without the 
authorisation of the UN Security Council, American President Barack Obama describes the Council 
as ”paralyzed” an ”unwilling” to hold anyone accountable for the attacks.27 In fact, the President 
believes that the absence of such an approval ”will show that the United Nations is incapable of 
enforcing the most basic of international laws”.28 The US thus means that it is in the interest of the 
UN to take action unless they are to be seen as an organisation that lacks real credibility and who 
looks the other way when individuals are committing horrendous crimes against the international 
law. Inaction on the whole can thus be said to be seen from the US viewpoint as refusing to hold 
criminals liable for their crimes and as a failure to enforce international law. 
25 The White House Office of the Press Secretary; Statement by the President on Syria; Whitehouse.gov; August 31 
2013; www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/08/31/statement-president-syria; retrieved 3 january 2014 
26 The White House Office of the Press Secretary; Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on Syria; 
Whitehouse.gov; September 10 2013; www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/09/10/remarks-president-address-
nation-syria; retrieved 3 january 2014
The White House; Statement by the President on Syria 
27 The White House; Statement by the President on Syria 
28 The White House Office of the Press Secretary; Remarks by President Obama in Address to the United Nations 
General Assembly; Whitehouse.gov; September 24 2013; www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2013/09/24/remarks-president-obama-address-united-nations-general-assembly; retrieved 3 january 2014
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As a contrast to the paralyzed and reluctant Council, an intervention is from the American 
part described as an energetic, noble option to the dangers of inaction.29 Actions of this kind are 
seen as part of the war on terrorism and as enforcing those international agreements concerning the 
use of chemical weapons.30 America also clarifies that an intervention would be accomplished with 
the aim of maintaining international peace and order, and as a way of protectioning Syria's civilian 
population from further attacks of this kind.31 The country here eradicates the common opinion that 
it would be intervening purely out of national interest and tries to erase the perception of its 
behavior as egoistic. It is instead attempting to promote itself as taking responsibility and stepping 
in to clear up the mess in Syria and protect its citizens from additional abuses when no other 
country is willing to do so. Indeed, President Obama declares that ”the danger for the world is not 
an America that is too eager to immerse itself in the affairs of other countries”, but an America that 
”may disengage, creating a vacuum of leadership that no other country is ready to fill”.32 The 
Americans look upon the intervention as a means of preventing mass atrocities and protecting basic 
human rights, and accordingly upon themselves as the protector of these core values. 
Interesting to note is also that America, when discussing an intervention, choose to describe 
it using terms frequent in the international doctrine of Responsibility to Protect. Obama says 
American military action will be ”designed to be limited in duration and scope”, that it would be a 
“targeted strike to achieve a clear objective”, and repeatedly clarifies that the intervention would be 
designed to destroy Syrian stocks of chemical weapons without interfering in the ongoing civil 
war.33 One of the core principles presented in the doctrine when it comes to military intervention is 
that ”the scale, duration and intensity of the planned military intervention should be the minimum 
necessary to secure the defined human protection objective”.34 Using terms of this moral doctrine 
could possibly be seen as a skillful maneuver from America's side in an attempt to increase the 
legitimacy of its military operation. 
While the States expresses great confidence in talking about going forward and carry out an 
intervention without the official approval of the United Nations Security Council, the Russian 
Federation depicts such a conduct as highly dangerous and careless. In an article published in The 
New York Times, President Vladimir Putin declare that involving in the conflict will ”result in more
innocent victims and escalation, spreading the conflict far beyond Syria's borders”.35 Further 
destabilization of the Middle East and Nort African region is described as a probable result of an 
intervention, as well as increased violence on the whole.36 Putin in his article also point to the fact 
that there is a strong opposition against an intervention from a large number of countries and many 
political and religious leaders, furthermore mentioning that a planned strike could undermine 
multilateral efforts to solve other urgent problems in the area. From the point of view of Russia, any
country carrying out a military strike lacking Security Council approval is seen as very careless, 
29 The White House; Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on Syria
30 The White House; Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on Syria
31 The White House; Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jay Carney; Whitehouse.gov; 11 September 2013; 
www.whitehouse.gov/photos-and-video/video/2013/09/11/press-briefing#transcript; retrieved 4 december 2013
32 The White House; Remarks by President Obama in Address to the United Nations General Assembly
33 The White House; Statement by the President on Syria
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selfish and negligent when considering other countries opinions and efforts to bring peace in the 
Middle East. It is also seen as a behavior that is challenging the international law and present 
order.37 Putin even go as far as saying that an intervention ”could throw the entire system of 
international law and order out of system”.38 On the whole, Russia describes interventionism in the 
case of Syria as highly risky behavior and as promoting and spreading violence, and anyone 
encouraging such behavior as venturous. To further build a picture of actors promoting intervention 
as reckless, Putin refer to previous American military strikes in Afghanistan and Iraq, which he 
describes as ”ineffective and pointless”.39 
In his article, Putin continues in describing an intervention without approval from the 
Security Council as outermost incautious business by comparing the United Nations to its 
unsuccessful precursor the League of Nations. The President here states that the UN could suffer the
same fate as the League of Nations if ”influential countries bypass the United Nations and take 
military action without Security Council authorisation”. Hence the behavior of the US is not only 
pictured as reckless, but also as jeopardizing the future of the UN. Putin also presses the point that 
one of the foundational principles of the UN is that ”decisions affecting war and peace should 
happen only by consensus”, promoting an image of the US as selfish and counteracting the work of 
the UN. Important to note is also how Russia states that military action without Security Council 
permission would constitute an act of aggression, thus becoming illegal under international law (and
making anyone carrying out that intervention a criminal).40 
Noteworthy is that both Russia and the United States make a connection between an 
intervention and the global phenomenon of terrorism. While the States indicates that inaction ”could
lead to escalating use of chemical weapons, or their proliferation to terrorist groups who would do 
our people harm”, Russia imagines the chemical attacks as a provocation by the opposition in Syria 
(which is described as having connections to well-known terrorist groups) to drag other countries 
into the Syrian conflict.41 Russia here especially mentions the United States, and suggests that 
intervening in Syria only would be to respond to terrorists' claims of support from ”powerful 
members of the international community”.42 The Federation also very clearly states that a military 
strike would ”increase violence and unleash a new wave of terrorism”.43 Both countries accordingly 
accuses the behavior of the opposing side to promote the proliferation of terrorists. As a large 
number of us probably would concur with the idea of terrorists as some type of evil force, trying to 
picture your adversary as pro-terrorist becomes a powerful tool when constructing enemy images 
and enforcing the dichotomy of good and evil. 
The pictures that Russia and the United States want to build of each other appear clearly 
when we take a closer look on who is to blame for the chemical weapons attacks in Damascus. Both
sides have very clear and solid understandings when discussing this issue, and neither think of the 
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opposite position as even possible. The countries both refer to ”common sense”44 when defending 
their view, making clear that any other idea would simply be stupid (the American President even 
refers to the Russian standpoint as an ”insult to human reason” and as an insult to the legitimacy of 
the UN.45 Another American politician expresses that Russia's stance ”defies logic and 
probability”).46 Russia and the US are also accusing one another for not providing enough or 
trustworthy evidence to support their stance. For example, the Russian President declares, when 
confronted with the American pronouncing that the Syrian government would be responsible for the
attacks, that ”claims that proof exists, but that it is classified and cannot be shown to anyone are 
beneath criticism” and that such a conduct ”is simply a lack of respect for their partners and 
participants in international activities”.47  Hence we can see how both countries want to show how 
the other side is unreliable and have illogical opinions. 
As we can distinguish above, both Russia and America manage to mediate arguably clear 
messages about how they visualize any adherent of the opposite viewpoint. What they both have in 
common is that they want to build an image of the opposing side as illogical and irresponsible, and 
their conduct as a danger to international order and peace. Both sides see themselves as protectors 
of international core values and their behavior as completely reasonable. Intriguing is also their 
ravingly disparate opinions on the fact that the United Nations Security Council has not yet 
pronounced its approval for any foregin military operation within Syria's border. 
2.2 Portraying the Self and the Other 
We have already seen how the US and Russia sometimes straight out pronounce their opinion of 
any opponent when it comes to intervening in Syria. However, these statements about the 
intervention and the conflict are also full of other messages, not always as obvious and as easy to 
discover. Taking a closer look upon the rhetoric used, we can track down traces of enemy images 
and self-promoting terms and bit by bit manage to put together what images each country wants to 
encourage of themselves and how they want others to imagine their enemy. These images do not 
necessarily have to be linked to the Syrian conflict, but can be part of broader, context loose images 
that the states are continuously working on. In this section of the essay, I will distinguish four 
different images that appear within the context of the Syrian conflict, two American ones and two 
Russian ones. 
2.2.1 American leadership and a hint of exeptionalism
There are probably few surprised should the Americans promote themselves as a hegemonic 
superpower, imagining themselves as taking the lead in many hotly discussed world issues. 
Americans often picture themselves as leading the world forward, something of which there are 
clear evidence in their rhetoric. Obama in his remarks, for example, often talks about America's 
given role in the world, as well as the burdens of leadership that the country has to bear.48 As we 
44 The term “common sense” frequently appears whenever both countries are talking about their opponents' 
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have already seen, the President expresses that the world should be concerned if the US one day 
would choose to disengage in the affairs of other countries, as this would create ”a vacuum of 
leadership that no other nation is ready to fill”.49 This particular belief that no other state would yet 
be able to walk in the footsteps of America is part of the larger conviction that Americans have of 
themselves as truly different and exeptional. 
American politicians often speak of their position as world leaders as full of burdens, that 
their role is not always easy and may be both unpopular and uncomfortable.50 Still America proudly 
takes on what it sees as its responsibilities in crises like the Syrian one, in part because they believe 
that they are ”called upon to lead in circumstances like this”.51 Here we discover once again traces 
of the American self-image as them being both selected and exceptional. We can also see how 
America connects responsibility with world leadership, as they make clear that they do not only 
bear their role in times of peace and order, but continues to lead the world when they are challenged
and criticized. The picture created here is the one of the responsible world hegemon who leads the 
world through good times as well as hardships. 
The concept of American leadership includes inter alia enforcing international agreements 
and standing up for core values such as human rights and human dignity as a means of guarding 
international security.52 American President Obama describes these assignments as ”burdens of 
leadership” but also states that ”the world is a better place because we have borne them”, and that 
America is an ”anchor of global security”.53 This conception that its actions foster the interests of 
the vast majority of the world's states is a common one and one of the characteristic ways in which 
the US justifies its conduct. For example, Obama states the decision to take military action against 
Syria as being in the security interest of the rest of the world ”to meaningfully enforce a prohibition 
whose origins are older than the United Nations itself” (by prohibition implying the Chemical 
Weapons Convention).54 The claim that this Convention has been approved by 98 percent of 
humanity is a frequently recurrent argument when legitimating an American military operation in 
Syria.55 Hence America advances the understanding of their actions as being beneficient for all and 
counters the perception of them acting purely out of national interest. This puts together an image of
America as unselfish and as minding about the international community, an image supported by 
statements as the one that America has ” shown a willingness through the sacrifice of blood and 
treasure” to stand up for ”the interests of all”.56 
Connected to this understanding of headship is how America whishes to state themselves as 
a good example and a rolemodel for the remaining countries. President Obama expresses this in an 
official statement, where he declares that ”our power is rooted not just in our military might, but in 
our example as a government of the people, by the people and for the people”.57 The Americans 
frequently press the sensitive point of democratic values and picture themselves as being a 
49 The White House; Remarks by President Obama in Address to the United Nations General Assembly
50 The White House; Remarks by President Obama in Address to the United Nations General Assembly
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rolemodel for the rest of the world's democracies. Obama himself often talk about his country as the
”world's oldest constitutional country” and that this is what constitutes the power of his country, as 
well as mentioning how the US is a country that ”stands up for democratic values and human rights 
in our country and the rest of the world”.58 He also speeks about America as the country ”of 
freedom of expression”, something which makes his country “truly exceptional”.59 When justifying 
disputed actions abroad, the US talks about defending values such as democracy and fighting for 
ideals and principles rather than promoting particular political interests.60 This connection to human 
rights and democracy is also used by the US as a means of contrasting itself to its foes. Russia for 
example, is clearly described as a nation not standing up for these values (the fact that Russia from 
an American point of view does not stand up for democratic values and human rights is also 
something that “demonstrates why America is exceptional”).61 If we look upon this assertion out of 
the theoretical perspective used as a basis for this essay, we find both the constructing of an enemy 
image and the creation of binary oppositions as a means of differing yourself from your opponent 
(in this case, America pictures itself as a democracy and as defending human rights, whereas Russia
is imagined as the contrary). 
We can also see additional examples of America promoting itself as a country protecting 
human rights when we further investigate its manners of talking about its activities in Syria. The 
country preferably talks about its conduct as being ”humanitarian” and supportive aid to the Syrian 
civilians.62 It is also a known fact that America is backing up the political opposition in Syria.63 
When delineating this assistance, America rather refers to the opposition as the ”Syrian people” and 
repeatedly describes the opposition forces as ”moderate”.64 Picturing the opposition as sober and 
moderate could possibly be seen as a means of distancing the US from any type of excessive 
violence and as contrasting the resistant forces with the government, thereby attempting to 
deligitimate the government's rule. In this way, America builds an image of itself as helping the 
exposed Syrian people in a responsible way and as non-supportive of the governments actions. This 
may also be one of the reasons why the US so eagerly attributes the contested use of chemical 
weapons in Syria to the ruling forces. 
Along with concepts of leadership and role models, another foundational feature of the 
American self-image is the one of exceptionalism.65 Caroline Kennedy states in an article 
concerning US foreign policy that the tendency to see the US as exceptional is deeply imbedded in 
the American culture.66 Kennedy furthers her reasoning by expressing that ”the thought and practice
of US foreign policy has been marked by a tendency to see itself as a beacon of light in an 
otherwise problematic world”.67 Indeed, this concept of exceptionalism is frequently occuring in the
rhetoric of American politicians, often as a means of justifying the country's actions. The US is 
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descibed straight up as ”a unique nation” and the Americans state that “the responsibilities that we 
bear when there are crises around the world are unique”.68 this understanding of themselves as 
different and exceptive is also in part used as a way of legitimating American world leadership.
So far we can depict a general image of the US as responsible leaders, being truly 
exceptional in their character and as standing up for important values such as democracy and human
rights. When examining the rhetoric of the US in the documents used for the purpose of this essay, 
we can also trace other pieces of the American self-image, perhaps more specifically linked to the 
situation in Syria. In the case of chemical weapons utilized in Syria, the US has made clear that the 
employment of such weapons would be the ”red line for intervention in Syria”.69 This statement as 
well as the ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention make up the foundations for an 
American intervention in Syria, an intervention that as we have seen is partly about ”sending a 
message”. Intervening would also be a way for the Americans to show that they ”follow through on 
the things they say, the accords that they sign, and the values that define them”.70 America clearly 
want to be looked upon as a country that sticks to its pronouncings and to its values and principles. 
The American president also states that an American military strike would ”send a message to 
Assad that no other nation can deliver”, once again demonstrating the phenomenon of American 
exceptionalism.71 
However, American president Obama declares that he has come to the decision to intervene 
”after careful deliberation”.72 Thus, even if they want to be seen as a power that follow through on 
the things they say, the Americans are also careful not make an impression of their decisions as rash
or unconsidered.  By stating that ”the United States has a hard-earned humility when it comes to our
ability to determine events inside of other countries”, Obama refers to previous interventions as a 
way of displaying American experience and knowledge in these issues.73 
In the event of diplomatic solutions now being discussed about how to solve the chemical 
weapons issue in Syria, the US is keen on taking cred for these negotiations taking place. The 
overall opinion is that the threat of an American intervention helped bringing forward these 
discussions, and that a diplomatic solution probably wouldn't be in sight if it weren't for this threat.74
Hence the US wants any progress or diplomatic settlements to be attributed to American efforts and 
accomplishments, perhaps to visualize how important their contribution is to stabilizing the world 
order. The US also stresses that even if it is prepared to take military action against Syria, its 
preference has always been a diplomatic solution to the problem.75 America is seen as a country that
does not back when it comes to protecting certain values through intervening, but also as a state that
posesses common sense and prefers a peaceful resolution when this is possible. 
Finally, one can note that it is very remarkable that, when Whitehouse Press Secretary Jay 
Carney is asked directly whether the US is above international law (on the fact that America is 
considering intervening without Security Council authorisation), the Press Secretary clearly avoids 
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answering the question.76 
To summarize, the American self-image is one of a benevolent hegemon who acts in the 
interest of all and whose actions protect values of democracy and human rights. In this sense the 
Americans look upon themselves as exceptional and unique, as leaders and role-models. The Us 
also wishes to foster an image of itself as easy to cooperate with, and as a country who makes 
efforts towards diplomatic solutions rather than solving Syrian problems with military force.  
2.2.2 Russia as the reluctant adversary 
While it is a fairly convenient mission to construct an image of the American self from 
investigating US oratory, it is harder to understand how the Americans want others to depict their 
opponent in this question, Russia. Caroline Kennedy talks about how the US pictures its adversaries
as she suggests that “there is a permanent temptation for the US to moralize its relations with others,
often rationalizing its own actions by demonizing its opponents”.77 This indicates that any traces of 
an American image of Russia would be negative ones and that Russian actions would probably be 
seen as irrational as to increase the credibility of American conduct. 
In general, one could say that the portrait of Russia discovered in US rhetoric is the one of a 
stubborn state unwilling to cooperate, often contrasted as America's outright counterpart. The 
United States uses this contrast as a means of demonstrating its own exceptionalism and justifying 
its own actions. There are also indications of the tendency to demonize enemies, as for example 
when America states that Russia does not stand for democratic values and human rights, or when it 
is pointed out that the freedom of expression is not encouraged in the Federation.78 Both of these 
pronouncings are made to compare Russia with America and enforces a binary opposition of 
democracy and non-democracy. 
The most remarkable feature of the Russian image is that Russia frequently is pictured as 
uncooperative and unwilling to solve the crisis in Syria. For example, it is stated that America has 
had nothing but “two years of complete lack of cooperation with Russia on the United Nations 
Security Council when it came to dealing with Syria”.79  Any willingness do deal with the question 
is depicted as a result of the threat of an American military intervention as well as diplomatic efforts
from the American part. Before this threat of military action, there was “not a lot of optimism about 
resolving this diplomatically with Russia's help, given the role that Russia had played in the past”.80 
The US depicts Russian behavior as kind of predictable, as for example when Jay Carney says that 
he was not “surprised by President Putins words”, referring to the Russian Presidents article in New 
York Times.81 
On the same matter, it is also said that “Russia has played the role of blocking international 
efforts thus far to hold Assad accountable”82, which enhances the picture of Russia as unwilling to 
cooperate, and also higlights an unwillingness to keep offenders of international law accountable for
their crimes. The US further states that letting Assad continue his rule will lead to an “increasingly 
violent space for extremists to operate”, which would suggest that Russian conduct would to some 
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extent be pro-terrorist.83 This kind of support and Russian disinclination to intervene in Syria is also 
said to encourage the proliferation and usage of weapons of mass destruction, most likely an 
undesirable image that Russia would like to counteract. 
Another characteristic attribute of the American imagination of Russia is that the US try to 
depict its enemy's behavior as illogical and irrational. American understandings and actions are 
referred to as “common sense”, contrary to Russia's (for example, the Russian belief that the 
opposition is responsible for the chemical weapons attacks in Syria is, as we have already seen, 
described as “an insult to human reason”). Russia is seen as “isolated and alone in blaming the 
opposition of the chemical weapons attack”, as to intensify the understanding of the Russian stance 
as irrational.84 
America also tries to undermine Russian credibility by connecting it to the Syrian Regime. 
The Federation is seen as “Assad's patron and protector”, thus implying that Russia should have 
some influence on the leader's attitudes and appearance.85 As the commander's behavior sometimes 
is seen as highly violent and dubious, it would probably harm Russia's image to be seen as 
supportive of such a personage. It is also a common American assumption that President Putin has 
invested his prestige and credibility when suggesting a diplomatic solution in the place of an 
American intervention to resolve the issue of chemical weapons in Syria.86 
To sum up, American oratory does not provide a picture of the Russian Federation at all as 
clear and complete as the image it mediates of the United States. Instead there are a few points it 
presses when discussing Russian attitudes and actions. In those cases, the intention seems to be to 
contrast Russian behavior with American conduct, as a means of mobilizing greater support for the 
American viewpoint. Russia is depicted as the American counterpart concerning democracy and 
human rights, as well as reluctant to work for a solution to the disagreements concerning Syria. The 
Federation is believed to be an illogical and irrational enemy, supportive of the horrible regime of 
Assad in Syria. 
2.2.3 A defender of international law and order
If it was somewhat difficult to outline how the Americans want the international community to 
picture Russia, it has been even harder to contour what profile the Russians would like to mediate of
themselves. However, it seems like the pieces of the Russian self-image almost directly correspond 
to the image that the US is trying to promote of the Federation. For example, while the US wants 
the world to believe that Russia has been unwilling to cooperate, the Russians describe themselves 
as collaborating and taking initiatives to find a peaceful solution to the problems in Syria. In the 
same way they are also convinced that their stance is the one representing common sense, while the 
American viewpoint should be seen as illogical.87 Russia also tries to work against the 
understanding of its country as not supporting democracy or human rights. Similarily to America, 
the state describes its operations in Syria using terms such as humanitarian, support and civilian. 
The Government is talking about how they are helping Syria through “humanitarian cooperation”, 
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“humanitarian aid” and “support for the civilian population”, thus making an impression of them 
caring about the violations of human rights in Syria. 88 
Furthermore, the Russian Federation counters the American claim that they would promote 
the dispersion of chemical weapons as weapons of mass distruction by stating that “we are 
categorically opposed to them, we condemn them and accordingly, if their use can be proven, we 
will participate in developing countermeasures”.89 
Another thing that the Federation whishes to clearify is that it is not supporting the Syrian 
regime by combatting a military attack against the country, but is simply protecting international 
law and order. President Putin could in his article in the New York Times not pronounce this fact 
any clearer, as he states that: “We are not protecting the Syrian government, but international law”.90
This is also how the president explains the use of its veto power in the United Nations Security 
Council. Putin declares that “we need to use the UN Security Council and believe that preserving 
law and order in today's complex and turbulent world is one of the few ways to keep international 
relations from sliding into chaos”.91  In this way Russia manage to profile themselves as reponsible 
representatives of international law and order rather than as proponents of Assad's regime, and this 
connection to law and order is one that the Russians cling to.
Russia also whishes to favour themselves as the peaceful alternative to the intervening 
Americans, for example by stating that the state has “advocated peaceful dialogue enabling Syrians 
to develop a compromise plan for their own future”.92 In this statement the Russians also indicate 
how they are prepared to let the Syrians decide about the outcome of their own future, possibly to 
demonstrate how they are protecting democratic values and contrasting themselves further to an 
American military operation. President Putin also declares that “we must stop using the language of 
force and return to the path of civilized diplomatic and political settlement”, further enforcing the 
image of Russia as peaceful and civilized.93
In conclusion, we can see that the most powerful feature the Russians wish to mediate of 
themselves is that they are defenders of international law and order, rather than the Syrian regime. 
They also try to promote a picture of their country as very willing to cooperate, as well as they are 
trying to counter the perception of their Federation as against human rights values. Russia also work
on mediating a picture of their standpoint as the peaceful alternative to an American military 
operation. 
2.2.4 Breaking international law the American way
The Russian enemy image of the United States is in many respects the same one as the 
profile discussed in the paragraph concerning the view on interventionism in this essay, as those 
remarks are almost directly directed towards America. It is a picture of a reckless country, refusing 
to think twice about striking against Syria, and that is presented as not caring about further menaces 
and suffering that their actions would spread. Its actions are described as challenging the 
international law and order and the legitimacy of the United Nations. Moreover, the United States 
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conduct is delineated as pro-terrorist and its intervention as an act of aggression and offense against 
the law. 
Nevertheless, there are som additional pieces to add to the Russian comprehension of 
America. One of these pieces concern the democratic image of America, and how the country may 
not be as good a rolemodel as they wish to be in this aspect. Putin states in his article in the New 
York Times how “millions around the world increasingly see America not as a model of democracy 
but as relying solely on brute force, cobbling coalitions together under the slogan “you're either 
with us or against us””.94 This stance is enforced when President Putin speak of a pronouncement by
the South African President, stating that “it seems like a more powerful country can use force at any
time at its own discretion” (possibly referring to US as a country that takes military action without 
caring about other countries' interests).95 Additionally, the Russian President mentions that “it would
suffice to look at European and US sociological surveys” to understand that “the overwhelming 
majority of their populations are on our side”.96 Putin here emphasizes that most Americans are 
against an intervention abroad, and that the American government by defying the will of its people 
are disrespecting the power of democracy. The democratic capacity of its country is one of the 
United States' strongest arguments for legitimizing its power and actions and is hence a vulnerable 
and effective point to press if you want to undermine the country's credibility. We can also see how 
Russia tries to counter the American belief of the Us as an exceptional country. Putin states that he 
disagrees with a case Obama made on American exceptionalism, pronouncing that “it is extremely 
dangerous to encourage thamselves as exceptional, whatever the motivation”.97
Other remarkable pronouncements made by the Russian President have been made, such as 
the one where Putin states that he would “first and foremost adress Barack Obama not as my 
colleague, not as the President of the United States and the head of state, but as a Nobel Peace Prize 
laureate”.98 In the same sentence, the Federation's president further says that “the United States 
initiated armed conflicts in various parts of the world”.99 Putin probably mentions the Nobel Peace 
Prize and previous military actions taken by the US to defy the American decision to intervene and 
remind president Obama about the responsibilities that a Peace Price brings with it. If you want to 
preserve the image of yourself as peaceful, probably starting a new war through a weakly supported
military intervention would not be the best decision. 
Further noteworthy is how Russian politicians want to depict the Americans as liars. Putin 
states straight out how American politicians are “lying shamelessly” about the situation in Syria, 
how they know they are lying, and that it is sad.100 Simultaneously, the President describes how the 
Russians are communicating with the Americans, assuming that they are “decent people”, but that 
the Americans are telling lies and that this feels “unpleasant”.101 By saying this, the US is imagined 
as lying and undecent, and the Russians as the counterpart as they are distancing themselves from 
this behavior. 
Finally, the Russians are also in principle trying to promote the perception that Americans 
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think they stand above international law. Obama has stated that he is seeking authorisation from the 
American Congress to realize an intervention102, something that has been heavily critized by the 
Russians. Putin calls this a “distortion of international law” as “no congress of any country can 
authorise something like this”.103 Instead, the Federation views such an approval from the American 
Congress as an authorisation and legitimation of aggression, and states that this behavior is 
“fundamentally unacceptable”.104 Hence, once again, we can see how the Russians would like to 
depict the US as a danger to the international law and world order. Consequently, they also 
proliferate and understanding of America as criminals, as the act of aggression indeed is a crime 
under international law. 
So, to end this analysis, we can see that the Russians are attempting to erase the 
understanding of America as an important democratic power, at once calling them liars who believe 
they are above the international law. They find American behavior reckless, and the united States is 
viewed as probably acting more out of national interest than for the protecting of certain ideals and 
values. 
102 The White House; Statemen by the President on Syria
103 President of Russia; Meeting of the Council for Civil Society and Human Rights 
104 President of Russia; Meeting of the Council for Civil Society and Human Rights 
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3. Discussion and Concluding Thoughts
Seeing that the purpose of this essay has been to delineate images that derive from the different 
perceptions the United States and Russia have of themselves and each other through a perspective 
based on theories of enemy images and binary oppositions, it appears appropriate to conclude this 
analysis with a brief discussion established on the analytical findings reasoned in the previous 
section as well as the essay's theoretical foundation. I will in this conclusive chapter build my 
articulation around two main issues. To begin with, I shall discuss the images depicted in the 
analytical section of this writing in relation to assumptions of and characteristics typical to enemy 
images on the whole. This will be done in order to distinguish to what extent Russian and American
understandings correlate with the general perception of how enemy images are constructed. Later 
on, I will lead a discussion based on the principle of binary oppositions and mirror images. The aim 
here is to see if we have discovered any completely binary oppositions or images while 
investigating the rhetoric, as to strengthen Philip Smiths theories, and to see what characteristic 
codewords will emerge for each country. 
3.1 American and Russian Images in Relation to Typical Features of Enemy Images
Although most enemy images differ from one another in some way depending on, for example, 
what the purpose of the constructing of the image is, pictures of this kind usually have some 
characteristics in common. Spillmann and Spillman mentions that typical features and symptoms of 
enemy images may be distrust, de-individualization of the adversary, placing guilt on the enemy, 
zero-sum thinking and inability to empathize with the other side.105 It is also common to see the 
enemy as self-centered, inhumane or morally unfit, as well as depicting the opponent as different to 
the self when it comes to basic values and ideals.106 Looking through the separate images that have 
emerged during the course of this analysis, we can easily see how they contain several of the classic
characteristics of enemy images. 
3.1.1 Distrust
 Distrusting your enemy or someone that you are in any kind of conflict with would presumably be 
seen as natural, and it is therefore not surprising that we can distinguish elements of distrust when 
America and Russia are talking about one another. The perhaps clearest example of distrust in this 
narrative can be found just by looking upon the issue of chemical weapons in the Syrian conflict 
and who have used them. Both countries state straight out how they for various reasons do not trust 
the opponent's stance and claim of evidence.107 The adversary is very clearly portrayed as not being 
trustworthy. 
It is also easy to discover a more general feeling of distrust between the two countries, 
perhaps due to previous decades of Cold War and dubious behavior from both sides. For instance, 
the US does not seem completely convinced about the real underlying causes for Russia's sudden 
will to work out a peaceful solution to the matter of chemical weapons in Syria. The statement that 
105 Spillmann, Kurt R. and Spillmann, Kati; On Enemy Images and Conflict Escalation; Social Science Journal; Feb. 
1991; Vol. 43 Issue 126; p 56-58
106 Pruitt, Dean G. and Kim, Sung Hee; Social Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate , and Settlement; 3rd edition; New York; 
McGraw-Hill; 2004; pp 105-106
107 See the section in this essay concerning both countries views on a possible intervention in Syria. 
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America did not have “a lot of optimism about resolving this diplomatically with Russia's help” 
furthers an understanding that the countries are not completely trusting one another.108 Russia also 
seem to have suspicions about American conduct, not believing US motivations for intervening in 
the Syrian conflict and perhaps thinking that such an operation would be performed out of national 
interest rather than for the maintaining of some universally good ideals and principles.This 
corresponds to the perception that actions of the enemy often are attributed to self-serving motives 
(whereas the same actions taken by one's own country rather are ascribed to altruistic motives), a 
common feature of enemy images.109
3.1.2 Moral unfitness
Another particular attribute of enemy images is the way in which we picture hostile actors as 
“morally unfit”, or as being “less moral” than ourselves.110 The moral ingredient of this kind of 
image becomes easy to distinguish in superpower oratory, as the moral argument constitutes a big 
piece of the large jigsaw-puzzle of reasoning that is laid when both states are trying to justify their 
particular stance in relation to Syria. The United States describes it as morally indefensible to stand 
by and watch as civilians are dispatched by the use of chemical weapons, and the Russians likewise 
talk about intervention as ethically untenable as it would adventure international law and order. 
Both countries in this way depicts actors not supporting their particular stance as immoral. 
These arguments of ethics are also related to the ways in which we may depict our enemies 
as self-centered and inhumane.111 Although there are few specific examples where the countries 
image each other as egoistic (one example may be how Russia states that an American military 
operation in Syria may undermine multilateral efforts in the Middle East), we have seen how the 
Americans carefully seek to portray themselves as acting in the interest of all (thus as the opposite 
of being self-centered). Following an idea of binary oppositions, opposing conduct should be seen 
as self-centered and as a way of not caring about others. The same goes in this case for the 
inhumane characteristic. There are no specific examples where the Americans depict Russia as 
inhumane (although the US tries to point out Russia as not caring for human rights), but the US is 
picturing the use of chemical weapons and its effects as inhumane, and the unwillingness to 
confront this problem as the like. Hence unwillingness to act could also be seen as inhumane 
behavior. Though, Russia declares that action in the case of Syria will spread further menaces and 
suffering, which could presumably also be labelled as behaviour leading to inhumane outcomings. 
3.1.3 Placing guilt on the enemy
Describing the opposite side as morally unfit is in this case also akin to how we in conflicts are 
tempted to place guilt on our enemy. Both America and Russia loosly describe what would happen 
should the other side get things their way. Russia, as we have already seen, does this by saying that 
American conduct will threaten the international law and order, while America on the other side 
states that Russian behaviour for example may encourage the proliferation of chemical weapons to 
terrorists. Should any of this occur, the countries have in this way safeguarded themselves from any 
108 The White House; Press Briefin by Press Secretary Jay Carney (9/11/2013)
109 Sande, Goethals, Ferrari and Worth; 1989: 91 
110 Pruitt and Kim; 2004: 106
111 See for example how Oppenheimer describes how negative characteristics previously defining the self becomes 
dissolved in the development of enemy images, as “one becomes more “human” and the enemy less so”. 
(Oppenheimer, 2006: 270)
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blame as they have already stated that the actions of the adversary would eventually result in these 
happenings. So to say, they have in advance placed the guilt on the enemy. We can also see how the 
opposite is happening, namely how both powers eagerly take credit for successful actions related to 
this issue. For example, both Russia and America promotes the perception that it was their own 
efforts that lead to the diplomatic discussions concerning Assad's stockpiles of chemical weapons.112
3.1.4 Inability to empathize with the adversary
Perhaps one of the easier features of enemy images to discover in Russian-American relations is the
inability from both sides to sympathize with the enemy. Either side clearly has difficulties 
empathizing with each other's stances, as we can tell when we look upon how they call one another 
“illogical” or “irrational”. Both countries seem to lack an understanding of the opponents view of 
how the problems in Syria should be handled. They also seem to insist on the fact that solely their 
own stance is the right one, and appear to be unwilling to change their opinions. 
3.1.5 Additional observations concerning enemy images
As we can see above, the relations between Russia and America contain several of the characteristic
features of enemy images. Although the rhetoric of the documents examined show no evidence of a 
directly hostile relationship between the powers, it cannot be overlooked that the images created in 
the oratory in many ways resemble classical enemy images. We can also discover other phenomena 
that appear in relation to the creation of enemy images, for example how enemy images seem to be 
accompanied by an ameliorated picture of the self. To illustrate, there is in American oratory 
examples of the “false uniqueness effect”, namely the tendency to “see oneself as more likely than 
others to engage in positive behavior”.113 Americans frequently picture themselves as unique and 
exceptional, and have, as previously noticed, an inclination to image themselves as “ a beacon of 
light in an otherwise problematic world”.114 
Noteworthy is also how the different images that the US and Russia are creating of each 
other may actually be a source of conflict escalation.115 Nations are as we have seen immensely 
concerned about the way they appear in the eyes of others, and threats to to this image may produce 
both anger and fear.116 Hence actions or pronouncements from the opposing side that threatens 
Russia's or America's self- image may actually worsen the relations between the countries. 
     
3.2 Traces of Binary Oppositions and Mirror Images
The creation of enemy images also fosters the appearance of binary oppositions, as “the formation 
of enemy images is characterized by dualistic thinking”.117 So to say, picturing the adversary as the 
contrary of one self happens naturally when enemy images are generated and you attempt to 
distance yourself from your opponent. Thus binary oppositions and mirror images would be a 
natural consequence of the making of enemy images.
112The White House; remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on Syria 
The White House; Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jay Carney (9/11/2013)
113 Sande, Goethals, Ferrari and Worth; 1989: 102
114 Kennedy; 2013: 626
115 Pruitt and Kim; 2004: 104
116 Pruitt and Kim; 2004: 104
117 Wahlström, Riitta; Enemy Images and Peace Education; Malmö; Institutionen för Pedagogik och Specialmetodik; 
1989; p 5 
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During this research, no entirely opposite mirror images of Russia and America have 
appeared. To clarify, the understandings that America and Russia want to mediate of themselves and
their adversary are not completely contrary to each other.  However, we can find some dichotomies 
which are typical to both American and Russian delineations and that are part of their different 
images. 
For this last reasoning section of this essay, I wish to make clear what definition of mirror 
image and binary opposition I will use when discussing the analytical findings. By mirror image or 
mirror characteristic, I mean that when country X connects itself to one characteristic and describes 
its enemy as the opposite of that characteristic (for example good versus evil), this image is met by 
a completely reverse understanding from the adversary. By binary opposition, I simply mean that 
country X is linking itself to a specific feature and then depicts its opponent as the contrary of that 
feature. 
3.2.1 Rational versus irrational characteristics 
The contradiction of rational versus irrational behavior is perhaps the one appearing most clearly in 
both American and Russian oratory. Both countries depict their own behavior as rational and 
sensible whereas the opponent is described as irrational, resulting in mirroring characteristics. Same
goes for the dichotomy of logic contra absurdity. The US and Russia both picture their own 
opinions and actions as completely logical, while the same kind of conduct deriving from the 
opposite side is seen as illogical. Here we have two examples of how the Russian understanding of 
itself and the enemy is directly mirrored by the American understanding of the self and its foe. The 
understanding of the self being logical is additionally strengthened when the powers refer to 
common sense as to further justify their stances. These contradictions of rationality and irrationality
or logic versus absurdity appear for example when the states are talking about their views of an 
intervention, or when the issue of the utilization of chemical weapons in the Syrian conflict is 
discussed. 
3.2.2 Democratic versus non-democratic
Although the contrarity of democracy and non-democracy does not appear as frequently as the 
contradictions of rational and irrational or logical and illogical, it is still a pair of oppositions that 
are easy to detect. We can easily see how both countries wish to promote themselves as caring for 
democratic values such as for example human rights, and at the same time are working on spoiling 
the democratic image of the other. The word democracy is in today's society very positively loaded, 
making it an important piece of a preferable self-image. For instance, both countries work hard on 
describing their conduct in Syria in humanitarian terms, and America repeatedly refer to its country 
as an old constitutional democracy.
3.2.3 Complementing mirroring characteristics
Other mirror characteristics appearing in Russian and American oratory are for example ones with 
terrorist elements, attributes related to cooperation, and claims of responsibility versus recklessness.
Both powers accuse the opponent's actions of risking proliferation of terrorists and weapons of mass
distruction, at once arguing that one's own actions are counteracting these negative consequences. 
Similarly, Russia and America eagerly promote their own efforts at cooperation and participation 
when it comes to solving Syrian difficulties, while they are depicting their adversary as stubborn 
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and hard to cooperate with. Finally, the claim of being responsible is adopted by both superpowers, 
as opposing behavior or views are labelled as being inconsiderate.
3.2.4 Codewords
When examining the oratory of these powerful countries, we may detect that certain words or 
phrases occur more often than others when the states are talking about themselves and each other. 
There are, so to say, a few qualities or attributes that America and Russia highlight more than 
others. For America, such codewords would be for example “leader”, “exceptional” or 
“constitutional democracy”. These terms occur frequently in American rhetoric and are foundational
building blocks of the US self-image, as well as they may be part of the justifications the country 
makes for its actions. Similarily, American codewords when talking about Russian conduct may be 
“uncooperative” or maybe “pro-terrorist” (the latter probably aiming at Russian unwillingness to 
deal with the chemical weapons problem and Russian support to the Syrian regime). Russian 
codewords are not as easy to detect as American ones, probably because of, as we have already 
shown, the fact that Russia does not seem to put much effort into creating images or oppositions of 
this sort. Though, the Federation continuously presses the point of “law and order” and “common 
sense”. For the American part, we can se how Russia aim at descriptions such as “reckless”, 
“unreliable” or the fact that Americans are believed to stand above the law. 
Of course American and Russian perceptions are very complex and cannot be reduced to a 
set of words or terms. However, codewords like these may help create an understanding of what 
kind of pictures these countries are attempting to compose. 
3.3 Concluding Thoughts
In the course of this essay, we have taken a closer look upon American and Russian oratory in 
statements and remarks concerning the current situation in Syria in order to depict three different 
understandings. First and foremost, we have examined what each country think of the American 
idea to intervene in Syria so as to get hold of chemical weapons used in the conflict and prevent 
their further distribution. Here we discovered that Russia and America have quite different 
meanings considering such a military action. While Russia imagines that an intervention would only
exacerbate the conflict and lead to further menaces and suffering, the US believes that an 
intervention is necessary in order to send a message about the use of weapons of mass distruction 
like these, and to prevent further proliferation of the weapons to for example terrorist organisations. 
The Russian Federation believes that a military operation, especially without authorisation from the 
United Nations Security Council, would adventure the current world order and challenge the 
international law. It would also undermine the real power of the United Nations and promote an 
understanding that powerful countries may take action on their own behalf without further 
consequences. In short, American conduct is picutured as reckless, as negligent of other countries 
often multilateral efforts to bring peace to the Middle East, and as a danger to international law and 
order. America, on the other hand, firmly believes that it will be more dangerous to stand beside the 
conflict without trying to ameliorate the situation for the people in Syria. For them, this is an issue 
of human dignity and humanity, and they believe that failure to act from the side of the UN is what 
will undermine its credibility as a peace-bringing organisation.
The second question examined during this analysis have been what kind of image or 
understanding each country wishes to mediate of itself. From the American side, we have here seen 
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that the country preferably pictures itself as a world leader with good intentions as it is defending 
important values and principles. Specific to the context in Syria, the US promotes its efforts to bring
forward an diplomatic solution as well as its willingness to cooperate to stop the violence in the 
country. The superpower also presses the point of how it takes on the burdens of world leadership 
without complaining, and how it in its actions and beliefs is exceptional and unique. Russia likewise
mediates an positive picture of itself, as a defender of international law and as a stable and peaceful 
alternative to unconsidered American conduct. The Federation as well as America stresses that it 
has been cooperative considering the Syrian issue. They too attempt to promote how they encourage
human rights and other humanitarian values. 
Thirdly, we have in the same way investigated which picture America and Russia have been 
trying to proliferate of each other. Here the US pictures Russia as reluctant to cooperate and as 
blocking international efforts to solve the Syrian crisis. The Federation is imagened as not 
promoting the values of democracy and human rights within its country, at the same time as its 
behavior mostly is pictured as being irrational and against common sense. Russia in the same way 
states that American conduct counters common sense, as its reasons for taking action lack a logical 
stance. Russia also try to eradicate the common understanding of America being an important 
democratic power. 
To sum up, we have in the analytical part of this essay captured two opposite understandings
of the effects of an intervention as well as four different images that America and Russia hold of 
themselves and each other. Furthermore, we have in the debating part of this writing tried to 
examine the relationship between these pictures and the classic buildstones of enemy images, as 
well as what kind of mirror images and binary oppositions we have been able to trace in the 
pictures. Here we have found that even if the relations between America and Russia within the 
context of the Syrian issue are not obviously hostile, their images of each other do indeed contain 
several of the typical elements of classical enemy images. Moreover, we have discovered that 
Russian and American understandings are not evident mirrors of each other, even if there are some 
reflecting elements of the perceptions. Finally, we have also very briefly talked about certain 
codewords appearing in this kind of superpower oratory.
So, in conclusion, we can tell that the teorethical foundation of this essay has indeed been 
helpful when we have examined the different pictures delineated in Russian an American rhetoric. 
Moreover, we can tell that the idea leading up to this anaysis, namely the idea that countries mediate
certain understandings of themselves and other actors through their rhetoric and actions, has proven 
to be true.
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